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In INS v. Phinpathya, the Supreme Court interpreted the sevenyear continuous presence requirement for suspension of deportation as a condition which allows for no interruptions whatsoever.
This Article focuses upon Phinpathya in order to highlight the difficulties inherent in both literalist statutory interpretationand the
use of "legislative intent." The authorfirst presents a case history
of the suspension statute which demonstrates the radical departure represented by the Phinpathya interpretation.Next, the author analyzes the reasoning of the Phinpathya Court, concluding
that the Court's approach drains the presence requirement of substantive policy content. The author then proposes an alternate
mode of interpretation which would enlarge the realm of sources
upon which a court could draw in interpretinga statute, in order
to uncover and give actual effect to the statutory policy. Finally,
the author explores the post-Phinpathyapossibilitiesfor interpretation of the presence requirement.
INTRODUCTION

INS v. Phinpathya,1 a 1984 Supreme Court decision, represents a

reversal of over twenty years of jurisprudence interpreting the requirement that an alien seeking suspension of deportation 2 must
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1. 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982), originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
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show a continuous physical presence in the United States of not less
than seven years. Prior case law which considered the requirement
had developed a "meaningful interruption" standard in the assessment of an alien's absences during the required period of physical
presence. Simply stated, an absence during the seven year period was
not considered interruptive if it did not signify a decrease in the
hardship likely to be suffered by the alien upon deportation. In INS
v. Phinpathya, however, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
stated that the legislative intent of the suspension statute, expressed
by its "plain meaning," 3 required a strict application of the continuous physical presence requirement, allowing for no absences
whatsoever.
The fundamental premise of Justice O'Connor's approach to the
construction of section 244(a)(1) 4 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or "the Act") in Phinpathya expresses itself in her
reference to Jay v. Boyd,5 an older Supreme Court decision regarding the interpretation of the suspension statute. Justice O'Connor asserts: "We do justice to [Congress'] scheme only by applying the
'plain meaning of [section 244(a)], however severe the consequences.'-" That Justice O'Connor should look to Jay v. Boyd for
support in her literalist style of statutory interpretation casts a telling sidelight upon the overall tenor of the Phinpathyacase. In Jay v.
Boyd, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of suspension of deportation to Cecil Reginald Jay, a resident since 1914, who had been a
member of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1940. The Court
found that a regulation granting the Attorney General the right to
base his suspension decision upon information undisclosed to the
alien was not inconsistent with section 244, which, Jay had argued,
implicitly required a hearing:
There is nothing in the language of Section 244 of the Act upon which to
163 [hereinafter cited as INA].

3. 464 U.S. at 188.

4. Section 244(a)(1) of the INA provides:
As hereinafter prescribed in this Section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend the deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies
to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation

. . . is

deportable under

any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of
this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such
application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of
good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would in the opinion
of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence ....

INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
5. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
6. 464 U.S. at 192 (quoting Jay, 351 U.S. at 357).
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base a belief that the Attorney General is required to give a hearing record
with respect to the considerations which may bear upon his grant E7
or denial
of an application for suspension to an alien eligible for that relief.

Jay v. Boyd may indeed have seemed a proper model for the
Phinpathya decision, for the Court confines itself solely to the literal
language of section 244 to determine the appropriateness of the confidential information regulation, implicitly discarding all other avenues of justification or relegitimization. Moreover, Jay v. Boyd was
decided during an era when Supreme Court decisions were characterized by the presence of "sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support
them in reason .... "s

Opinions characterized by a tone of flat assertion rather than careful deliberation are not a surprising result when a court feels compelled to restrict itself to the literal language of a statute to produce
a just construction. Although in Phinpathya Justice O'Connor moves
out of the confines of the words of section 244(a)(1) in examining
the statute's legislative history, it is only to justify her theory that
Congress' literal language is the best evidence of its intent.9 In a
time when this literalist mode of interpretation seems to characterize
much of the Court's statutory reasoning, x? one may justifiably wonder whether a return to the age of Jay v. Boyd has been signaled.
This question warrants a critical analysis of the interpretive methodology of the Phinpathya decision as well as an investigation of its
broader ramifications for the respective roles of the Court and
Congress.
This Article explores several significant questions raised by the
Court's literalist interpretation of the continuous physical presence
requirement in the suspension statute. The first section is a review of
the case history which led up to the Phinpathya decision; it follows
the development of the "meaningful interruption" standard, and
demonstrates the reversal represented by Phinpathya.The following
section is a critical analysis of the Phinpathyaopinion, focusing upon
the "clear statement" model of interpretation, and upon the use of
legislative history and statutory analogy. What are the purposes
7. Jay, 351 U.S. at 352-53.
8. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
9. See Phinpathya,464 U.S. at 189. The uses and abuses of legislative history to
show clear intent are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 54-80.
10. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Consumer
Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Mobil Oil Co. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).

served by the literalist approach in Phinpathya? What are its deficiencies? What substantive policy is effected by the strict interpretation of this aspect of the suspension statute? Does strict statutory
interpretation implement the legislative will, or ignore it? The analysis of this section demonstrates that confining a statute to its literal
meaning at the time of enactment is not reflective of legislative values, but rather of the mind of the legislature frozen at a particular
point in time. The Court's mode of interpretation ignores the judicial
development of suspension of deportation and obscures the substantive content of the physical presence requirement. In this, it actually
neglects the legislative policy behind the statute, while asserting that
it is following the legislative will.
The third section of the Article proposes an alternate model of
interpretation-the "common law" approach-as envisioned by
Guido Calabresi in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes." After
a short description of the approach, factors are enumerated which
the Court might have implemented had it treated the suspension
statute in the way courts treat common law doctrines. The
Phinpathya decision, this Article contends, would have better reflected present-day majoritarian values if it had analyzed the suspension statute as a principle from which one might draw a policy conclusion through examination of legislative, common law, and
administrative statutory evaluation. The Article concludes by evaluating the aftermath of Phinpathya:exploring the actual scope of the
decision, the effect of the Court's interpretation upon application of
the suspension statute as a whole, and the legislative response to the
decision.
THE HISTORY OF THE

Phinpathya DECIsION

Suspension of deportation originated as a humanitarian exception
to the severity of the deportation statute in the 1917 Immigration
Act, which had provided no remedy for the deportation of any alien
illegally present in the United States.' 2 Over the years, since its initial integration in statutory form into the body of immigration laws
in 1940, suspension of deportation has evolved into an avenue of discretionary relief for aliens of good moral character who have been
living in the United States for seven years or more, and have developed familial roots and community ties' 3 such that deportation
would create an extreme hardship for them or their families.
Whereas section 2081" (Asylum Procedure) and section 243(h) 15
11. G. CALABRESI, A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
12. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
7.9(a) (Supp. 1985). See also infra text accompanying notes 54-80.
13. See Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980).
14. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
15. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
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(Withholding of Deportation) of the INA provide relief for aliens
fleeing countries where they were, or would be, persecuted, the suspension remedy assists those aliens in illegal status whose reasons for
remaining in the United States are related not primarily to a condition in their mother country,"6 but to the degree of their settlement
into a permanent life in American society.
In recent years, the requirement of section 244(a)(1), that an
alien seeking suspension must establish that he has been physically
present for a continuous period of seven years, has been interpreted
liberally by several circuit courts as well as by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)17 in response to changes in the interpretation
of the "entry" doctrine of section 101(a)(13).18 This liberal interpretation of the seven year presence requirement allows for absences
which would not amount to an abandonment of the alien's commitment to a permanent life in the United States. In order to understand the basis for the generous construction of section 244(a)(1)'s
,continuous physical presence requirement, it is necessary to explore
the evolution of the "entry" doctrine.
Before Congress enacted the INA in 1952, courts had developed a
strict definition of "entry" which had severe consequences for aliens
of legal status in the United States who, after an absence, were
found excludable upon return. In United States ex rel. Volpe v.
Smith, 9 the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of an alien who,
after twenty-four years of legal residence, was found excludable
upon return from a trip to Cuba. The court ruled that "the word
'entry' . . includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country
16. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 600 (1950). See also Ahn v. INS,
651 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (political claims cannot be considered as an aspect
of "extreme hardship" for the purpose of suspension of deportation).
17. See, e.g., In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271 (BIA 1967).
18. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982). Section 101(a)(13) of the
INA provides:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a
foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United
States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the
purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or outlying possession was not intended or reasonably expected by him or his presence in a
foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided,
That [sic] no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned
by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to
be entitled to such exception.
19. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).

into the United
States whether such coming be the first or any sub' 20
sequent one."
In 1947, two judicial opinions, one in the Second Circuit and one
in the Supreme Court, recognized the harsh effects of the entry definition formulated in Volpe. In Di Pasquale v. Karnuth,2 1 Judge
Learned Hand refused to permit the deportation of an alien who
rode a sleeping car from Buffalo to Detroit without the knowledge
that the route of the train passed through Canada. In holding that
the alien did not "enter" upon his return from Canada, Judge Hand
commented: "We cannot believe that Congress meant to subject
those who had acquired a residence, to the sport of chance, when the
interests at stake may be so momentous. 22
In Delgadillo v. Carmichael,23 an alien had originally entered the
United States legally but after a ship he was aboard had been
torpedoed, had been rescued and taken to Havana. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to deport him for a crime.
of moral turpitude within five years of his last "entry," his return
from Cuba. The Supreme Court stated:
If ... his return to this country was an "entry" into the United States
within the meaning of the Act, the law has been given a capricious application .... We will not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to
remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as
those upon which the Immigration Service has here seized. The hazards to
which we are now asked to
2 subject the alien are too irrational to square
with the statutory scheme. '

In adopting section 101(a)(13) 26 in 1952, Congress discussed the
specific limitations on the entry doctrine by the Di Pasquale and
Delgadillo cases, cited those cases by name, and ultimately accommodated those decisions. 26 Section 101(a)(13) provides that an alien
has not "entered" when he can prove to the Attorney General that
his departure from the United States was "not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign
port or place
27
or in an outlying possession was not voluntary."
In 1963, the Supreme Court, in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,28 held that
the exceptions to the definition of "entry," created with Di Pasquale
and Delgadillo in mind, should be read nonrestrictively. Thus, "in20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
text.

Id. at 425.
158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
Id. at 879.
332 U.S. 388 (1947).
Id. at 390-91.
INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982). See supra note 18 for

26. See H.R. REP.No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d. Sess. 32 (1952); S.REP.No. 1137,
82d Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 (1952).
27. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1982).
28. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 95-98 for further
discussion of the Fleuti case and its reasoning.
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tent" for the purpose of section 101(a) (13) means "an intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive
of the alien's permanent residence. 29 If an alien's voluntary and
knowing absence from the United States is "innocent, casual and
brief,"3 0 as the Court found in the case of Fleuti's afternoon trip to
Mexico, it is not "meaningfully interruptive" of his presence in the
United States, so as to label his return an "entry" for the purposes
of possible exclusion.
Additionally, the Court in Fleuti enumerated several factors
which are relevant to the determination of whether the alien actually
intended to depart in a "meaningfully interruptive" manner: the
length of the absence, the purpose of the trip (whether the object of
the trip was in violation of United States immigration law), and
whether the alien had to procure travel documents, indicating consideration of the possible immigration consequences of departure. 3 1
In 1964, the Ninth Circuit applied the reasoning in Fleuti to an
alien's absence during the seven year period of continuous physical
presence required for eligibility under section 244(a)(1). In Wadman
v. INS,3 2 the court found that the significant issue is not whether
there was an absence in the period of presence required. Rather, the
question is whether the interruption, viewed in balance with its consequences, can be said to have been a significant one under the
guidelines laid down in Fleuti 3 Moreover, the court in Wadman
found that a rigid construction of section 244(a)(1) would be inconsistent with the statute's remedial purposes, because the apparent
purpose is to "ameloirate hardship and injustice. '3 4 The court added:
A strict and technical construction of the language in which this grant of
discretion is couched could frustrate its purpose. A liberal construction
would not open the door to suspension of deportation in cases of doubtful
merit. It would simply tend to increase the scope of the Attorney General's
review and thus his power to act in amelioration of hardship.-3

In Wadman, the court did not comment specifically upon the effect of, and the limits upon, a generous reading of "continuous physical presence" except to suggest that the determination of a meaningful interruption should be guided by the factors set out in
29.

Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 462.

30. Id. at 461.
31. Id. at 462.
32. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
33. Id. at 816.
34.

Id.

35.

Id. at 817.

Fleuti.38 Recent cases, however, have developed the principle that
the significance of the absence regarding the eligibility of the alien
for suspension depends upon the effect of the absence on the "ex-37
treme hardship" resulting from deportation. In Heitland v. INS,
the Second Circuit suggested that the continuous physical presence
requirement is a factor in determining whether deportation would
work severe hardship upon the alien, and that this purpose should be
taken into account in assessing the significance of the absence:
[D]eportation of an alien who had accumulated seven years of fragmented residence in the United States, interrupted by frequent or long absences abroad, would not be expected to work as much hardship upon him
as might result if he had resided in this country for an unbroken seven-year
period, since the latter might reduce the likelihood of his being able to establish his home elsewhere. The statute surely was not designed to protect
the wanderers or the rootless. .

.

. On the other hand, to deny a person the

benefits of seven years' continuous residence because of one or two short
interruptions might well defeat the purpose of Section 244(a)(1), since the
hardship in such a case would not be substantially different from that where
the presence has been uninterrupted.3 8

Similarly, in Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS,3 9 the Ninth Circuit explicitly addressed the purpose of the continuous physical presence
requirement in its assessment of an absence in the statutory period,
and concluded that this purpose is interrelated with the requirement
of extreme hardship. 40 The Kamheangpatiyooth court also found
that the guidelines enunciated in Fleuti for the determination of a
36. Id. at 816.
37. 551 F.2d 495 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
38. Id. at 501.
39. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. The court stated:
[T]he function of the Section 244(a)(1) requirement that an applicant for suspension of deportation be physically present in this country for a continuous
period of seven years becomes clear. It was Congress's judgment that presence
of that length was likely to give rise to a sufficient commitment to this society
through establishment of roots and development of plans and expectations for
the future to justify an examination by the Attorney General of the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether deportation would be unduly harsh. Continuity in the prescribed period of physical presence was required because continuity is important to the legitimacy of the inference that
extended presence is likely to make deportation harsh ....
To effectuate the purposes underlying the continuous period requirement,
and to realize Congress's desire (identified in Fleuti) to avoid exposing aliens to
unexpected risks and unintended consequences, the Board [of Immigration Appeals] must determine whether a particular absence during the seven year period reduced the significance of the whole period as reflective of the hardship
and unexpectedness of expulsion. An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully interruptive of the whole period if indications are that the hardship of
deportation to the alien would be equally severe had the absences not occurred,
and that no significant increase in the likelihood of deportation could reasonably have been expected to flow from the manner and circumstances surrounding the absence.
Id. at 1256-57.
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meaningful interruption-length of absence, its purpose, and the
procurement of travel documents-are only evidentiary in nature
since they could prove different conditions in varied circumstances. 1
This evolution of a "meaningful interruption" standard in assessing absences during the physical presence period under section
244(a)(1) came to a sharp halt with the Supreme Court decision in
the case of INS v. Phinpathya.42 Padungrasi Phinpathya, a citizen of
Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant
student. When her visa expired in July of 1971, she remained in ille-

gal status. In January 1974 she left the United States for Thailand

to visit her mother, who was ill. 43 In Thailand, she went to the

United States Consul and obtained a nonimmigrant visa as the wife
of a foreign student, in order to reenter the United States. She failed

to inform the Consul that her husband's student visa had expired

more than two years prior to that date.44 In January of 1977 the

INS commenced deportation proceedings against Mrs. Phinpathya

under section 241 (a)(2) of the INA.45 Mrs. Phinpathya conceded de-

portability and applied for suspension of deportation. The immigration judge denied Mrs. Phinpathya's claim for suspension after an
evaluation of her situation using the Fleuti factors as a guideline. 46
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, noting
that under Wadman, Mrs. Phinpathya's absence was a significant
interruption of her physical presence because it involved deception
and increased the likelihood that her illegal status would be discovered.47 The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA. Applying
41.
42.
43.
(1984).
44.
45.

Id. at 1257, 1259.
464 U.S. 183 (1984).
Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 183
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 186 n.2.
Section 241(a)(2) of the INA provides:

Any alien in the United States

. .

. shall, upon the order of the Attorney

General, be deported who. . . entered the United States without inspection or
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in
the United States in violation of this chapter or in violation of any other law of
the United States.
46. [Mrs. Phinpathya's] three month absence was not brief, innocent or casual. The absence would have been longer than three months if she had not obtained the spouse of a student visa as fast as she did obtain it. It was not casual
because she had to obtain a new Thailand passport, as well as a nonimmigrant
visa from the American Consul, because she failed to inform the Consul that
she was the wife of a student who had been out of status for three years (and
therefore not entitled to the nonimmigrant visa she received).
Phinpathya,464 U.S. at 186 (citing App. to Petition for Cert. at 28a).
47. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 186-87 (citing App. to Petition for Cert. at 17a-

the rationale of Kamheangpatiyooth,the Ninth Circuit held that the
BIA had focused too much attention on the fact that Mrs.
Phinpathya's absence increased the risk of her deportation and had
"failed to view the circumstances in 48
their totality and in light of the
underlying Congressional purposes."
In reversing the Ninth Circuit decision, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Supreme Court, held that on its face, section 244(a)(1) did
not admit any exception whatsoever to the seven year continuous
physical presence requirement. 49 The Court arrived at this conclusion by taking a literalist approach in interpreting the statute: "[W]e
assume 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used.' ,o Yet the Court moved beyond the
words of section 244 to look for support in the circumstances of the
re-enactment of section 244 in 1952. In a two-fold approach, the
Court first compared section 244(a)(1) with former section 301(b) of
the INA, which permitted an absence of sixty days in the two year
period of presence required for citizenship eligibility, and concluded
from its statutory analogy that Congress knew how to provide the
authority for flexible interpretation of a residence requirement when
it desired to do so.51 The Court's second step involved an examina-

tion of the specific legislative history of section 244(a)(1). The Court
found that House and Senate Reports during the debates over the
INA in 1952 indicate a legislative intent to strengthen section 244 to
prevent deliberate abuses of United States immigration law by aliens
seeking relief. 52 Thus, the Court concluded that the clear language
of section 244(a)(1) is evidence of congressional desire for the rigid
administration of the statute. Furthermore, the Court found the
Fleuti case inapplicable to the adjudication of suspension claims:
"[W]hereas a flexible approach to statutory construction was consistent with the congressional purpose underlying Section 101 (a)(13),
such an approach would not be consistent with the congressional
purpose underlying the 'continuous physical presence'

18a).
48. Kamheangpatiyooth, 673 F.2d at 1018.
49. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 188. Note that the issue of whether Congress intended § 244(a)(1) to admit exceptions to the continuous physical presence requirement
was not argued by the government in its brief to the Supreme Court. Rather, the government argued that Mrs. Phinpathya's interruption of her period of physical presence was
"meaningful" when evaluated within the guidelines set forth in Fleuti and Wadman. The
Supreme Court, sua sponte, ruled that the standard was inapplicable to § 244(a)(1).
Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence that the government stated at
oral argument that "the [INS] believes that there is room for flexibility in applying §
244." Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 197 (quoting transcript of Oral Arg. at 8).
50. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 188 (citations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 188-89.
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requirement." 3
In embracing the literal words of the continuous physical presence
requirement and rejecting the flexibility inherent in the application
of the Fleuti doctrine, the Phinpathya decision reversed over twenty
years of jurisprudence on this aspect of the suspension statute. A
close reading of Justice O'Connor's opinion reveals the problematic
nature of her "clear intent" mode of interpretation, and is crucial to
understanding the effect of section 244(a)(1) in its post-Phinpathya
application.
THE REASONING OF THE COURT

Plain Meaning, Clear Intent, and Legislative History
Justice O'Connor's construction of section 244(a)(1) begins with
the application of the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius: expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. 4 The opinion sets
forth its frame of reference-the words of the suspension statute itself-and finds that the face of the statute "does not readily admit
any exception[s] to the seven year requirement of 'continuous physical presence' in the United States to be eligible for suspension of
deportation. ' 55 By adopting the language of section 244 as an analytical starting point, the Court anchors the statute in a world of
legislative clarity and certainty, and diverts attention from the real
limits of both human speech and legislative enactment. As Max Radin suggests, expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim which
actually contradicts the customs of human speech: "To say that all
men are mortal does not mean that all women are not, or that all
animals are not."5' 6 Thus the notion that the mention of one thing
excludes the possibility of another actually runs counter to "ordinary
meaning." 57
One might argue, however, that a legislature enacting a statute,
aware of the ramifications of its task, places a premium upon linguistic precision, whereas humans, in their customary patterns of speech,
do not. A person engaging in normal conversation may correct him53. Id. at 190.
54. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 895 (1982). See also Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873 (1930).

55.

Phinpathya,464 U.S. at 188 (citing McColvin v. INS, 648 F.2d 935, 937

(4th Cir. 1981)).
56. Radin, supra note 54, at 873.
57. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 188.

self, or include the excluded item, much more quickly then a legislature can respond to an inadvertent exclusion. Nevertheless, this does
not indicate that a legislature, even in its most prudent use of language, can envision each possible circumstance that may arise under
the statute it is enacting. Indeed, legislative delay in responding to
the unforeseeable seems to argue against application of this maxim
of interpretation. As Wellington and Albert suggest:
Is it not unrealistic to assume that the legislature decided these questions
and embodied its decision in the language of the enactment? If... a court
decides a case because of a statute's plain meaning, its decision will be one
that rests upon abstract doctrine of statutory interpretation that bears no
necessary relationship to legislative purpose.58

Thus, the face of a statute upon the printed page gives no indication of emphasis upon particular words, 59 nor does it reveal possible
meanings of the statute in particular situations. The question becomes "whether we are [going] to deny or affirm [the rule expressio
unius] in this particular case. We shall evidently deny it or affirm it
for some other reason than its axiomatic force, and it will be necessary to search for that other reason." 60
In Phinpathya,the Supreme Court discovered the "other reason"
to affirm expressio unius est exclusio alterius in the legislative history of section 244(a)(1). Engaging in a technique which we might
call "statutory analogy," the Court examined the way in which Congress constructed other sections of the Act which required periods of
presence in the United States to qualify for immigration benefits.
The comparison led the Court to conclude that expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is indeed applicable, since the other statutes requiring presence explicitly provide for permissible absences: "[W]hen
Congress in the past has intended for a 'continuous physical presence' requirement to be flexibly administered, it has provided the authority for doing so. ' ' 1 The Court then moved to the legislative history of section 244(a)(1) itself, and asserted that it too supports the
restrictive interpretation of the statute.
One might note at this point that the inquiry into general legislative history and express provisions for permissible absences in other
sections of the Act to prove the exclusion of congressional intent to
provide for such absences in section 244(a)(1), necessarily negates
the notion that the ordinary meaning of the statute is clear from its
plain language. Once a court perceives the necessity of making
forays into statutory analogy and legislative history to support an
58.

Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the PoliticalProcess: A

Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1550 (1963).
59. Radin, supra note 54, at 874.
60.

Id.

61. 464 U.S. at 188.
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interpretation of a statute, that statute no longer stands on its own.
At this point, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius opens,

rather than answers, the question. 2 The Phinpathya Court, however,
fails to recognize that by looking to legislative history for support, it
has implicitly agreed that a possible ambiguity exists in the statutory
language. Having implicitly admitted the possibility, the Court ignores the Pandora's box of questions it has opened regarding the legitimacy of confining statutory purpose to legislative purpose at the
time of enactment. Rather, having begun with a literalist reading of
section 244(a)(1), "as a surrogate for actual legislative intent, '6 3 the
Court creates a legislative intent consistent with its strict interpretation by pointing to similar provisions with "built-in" flexibility and
by selecting legislative commentary from a certain point in the statute's development.
Although the Court proceeds from its statutory analogy to an
analysis of the history of section 244, this Article begins with the
Court's reading of legislative history. The general legislative background of section 244 will provide a broader understanding of the
critique of the Court's use of statutory analogy.
Selective Legislative History
Following a brief discussion of the origin of the suspension remedy, Justice O'Connor cites various statements from House and Senate Reports in support of the assertion that the 1952 reenactment of
section 244 made the application of the statute more stringent in
order to restrict administrative discretion and to prevent aliens from
abusing United States immigration laws. 4 This approach raises the
initial question of the legitimacy of locating the purpose of a statute
at a particular point in its legislative development. Does reenactment
of a statute necessarily signal change in overall policy goals of that
statute? Are alterations in the statute to be viewed in connection
with the original reasons for enactment, or totally apart from these
reasons solely in the context of the "legislative mind" in that particular year? Do subsequent liberalizations or restrictions in subparts of
a statute affect the application of other subparts of the same statute?
It seems that these questions can never be definitely answered unless
the legislative history of the statute is both unambiguous and prolific. As such clear and detailed legislative commentary is rarely
62. Radin, supra note 54, at 874.
63. Note, supra note 54, at 894.
64. Phinpathya,464 U.S. at 189.

available, the technique of "reading the legislative mind" at the time
of enactment becomes a potentially selective and misleading method
of supporting a particular interpretation.
In light of the foregoing, it is useful to examine briefly the history
of the suspension remedy, the focal point of Justice O'Connor's legislative history, from its origin until its re-enactment in 1952. The history of suspension of deportation indicates that the remedy was initially conceived as a humanitarian relaxation of the deportation
statute, which had allowed no exceptions to the rule that aliens illegally present in the United States had to be deported.65 When large
numbers of meritorious or "hardship" cases came to the attention of
the administrative authorities, the authorities requested that Congress legislate relief from deportation. As the authorities awaited
legislation, they withheld many orders of deportation 6 and instituted
the practice of pre-examination, which enabled illegal aliens who
met all entry requirements to obtain a visa in Canada, instead
of
67
having to return to their mother countries to await a visa.
In 1940, Congress created the Alien Registration Act ("Smith
Act").6 8 The Smith Act, inter alia, authorized the Attorney General
to suspend the deportation of an alien who could prove good moral
character for the preceding five years and who was not racially inadmissible or ineligible for naturalization in the United States, if the
Attorney General found that such deportation would result in serious
economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who was the
spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien.69 The suspension procedure of the Smith Act seems to have arisen, in part,
because Congress was overburdened with special bills for individual
relief from deportation, 70 the only method by which an alien could
receive such relief.L7 1 The congressional debate over the bill contains
references to the problem of hardship cases and the goal of relaxa65. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, § 7.9(a).
66. Id.
67. Id. §§ 7.7(a), 7.9(a).
68. Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), amending § 19(c) of the 1917 Immigration Act.
69. Id. at 672.
70. See 81 CONG. REC. H5542 (daily ed. June 10, 1937) (statement of Rep.
Dies):
It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritorious cases
was through special bills. I am absolutely convinced as a result of what has
occurred in this House that it is impossible to deal with this situation through
special bills. We had a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special
bills were before this House. The House consumed 5 1/2 hours considering four
bills and made no disposition of any of the bills. So necessarily the Congress of
the United States, representing 127,000,000 people and dealing as it does with
many major questions, cannot deal with all of the cases that are entitled exceptions in the deportation laws.
71. See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 140 & n.1 (1981).
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tion of the immigration laws,7 2 as well as references to
the fear of an
73
influx of aliens as a result of too liberal a measure.
In 1948 Congress amended the statute to authorize the Attorney
General to suspend the deportation of an alien under certain circumstances. 4 It is important to note that the 1948 amendment granted
relief to aliens whose deportations would result in economic hardship
to their families, and to aliens who had resided in the United States
for seven years, regardless of family ties. The purpose of the amendment, according to the Senate Report, was to enlarge the class of
aliens eligible for suspension.1
The large-scale revisions of the immigration laws which took place
in 1952 resulted in the replacement of the 1948 suspension process
with a new procedure. 716 Under the 1952 reenactment of the statute,
72. 81 CONG. REC. H5551 (daily ed. June 10, 1937) (Statement of Rep.
Sirovich): "[T]his bill contains certain provisions that will help to humanize the immigration law class of aliens now residing in the United States, eligible for citizenship but
who otherwise could never qualify on account of the obstacle of illegal entry."
73. 81 CONG. REC. H5544 (daily ed. June 10, 1937) (Statement of Rep. Taylor).
74. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The Attorney General can suspend deportation if the alien is not ineligible for naturalization or if ineligible, such ineligibility is solely by reason of his race, and if the Attorney General finds:
(a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or
legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien;
or (b) that such alien has resided continuously in the United States for seven years or
more and is residing in the United States upon the effective date of this Act.
75. S. REP. No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2236.

It is the information of the committee that there are a number of worthy
cases in which persons are racially ineligible for naturalization and are under
existing law subject to deportation. The only relief available to these people
would be private bills to adjust the immigration status of certain deportable
aliens who are racially ineligible for naturalization. It is only just that other
persons in this category who have not been favored by the introduction of private bills should have their cases considered for relief.
It is the information of the committee that there are a number of worthy
cases in which persons deportable on technical grounds, have lived in the
United States for many years, but have no close family ties so as to enable
them to become eligible for discretionary relief on the basis of serious economic
detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien, who is the spouse, parent, or
minor child of such persons. The committee has already considered and recommended the enactment of private bills to adjust the immigration status of certain deportable aliens who are in this general category. It is only just that other
persons in this category who have not been favored by the introduction of private bills should have their cases considered for relief.
76. INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) as enacted in 1952.
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who . . . has
been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less

the Attorney General was now authorized to grant suspension of deportation, in his discretion, to aliens who met the following three
eligibility requirements: good moral character, continuous physical
presence for seven years, and exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the aliens or their families as a potential result of deportation. According to the House Report, the reason for the changes
was to strengthen the statute "in an attempt to discontinue lax practices and discourage abuses." 77 In the main, the revisions represented
congressional response to studies by the Senate Judiciary Committee
which found abuse of the suspension remedy and excessive favorable
treatment of illegal entrants.78
It is interesting to note that, in its critical assessment of the provisions of the 1948 statute, the Senate Report discussed only the requirements of good moral character and serious economic detriment;
the requirement of continuous residence was not expressly considered
as a separate issue in the report.79 Arguably, then, the requirement
of continuous residence in the 1948 statute was not the primary
source of abuse in the eyes of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The
Senate Report does refer to the dissatisfaction of INS field officers
with overly liberal administration of the residence requirement,"" but
the legislative history gives no specific indication that the changes
were directly in response to this criticism.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Phinpathya gives an impression of
clarity in the legislative history as to the substitution of the words
"has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than seven years" in the 1952 enactment, for the
words "has resided continuously in the United States for seven years
or more" in the 1948 statute: "Finally in 1952, 'in an attempt to
discontinue lax practices and discourage abuses,' Congress replaced
than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, and
proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptionally and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien or to his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
77. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprintedin 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1682.
78. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 7.9(a). See also S.
REP. 1515, 81st Cong, 2d Sess. 600-02 (1950).
79. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong. 2d. Sess. 596-97 (1950).
80. E.g., the grant of suspension to an alien who had been absent as long as two
of the seven required years of residence. Id. at 602. In Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979), a case involving a nonfraudulent absence of thirty days, the
court felt that the statement of the INS field officers might indicate, if anything, an outer
limit to the length of a permissible absence, but certainly not a bar to relief. While the
court also suggested that the substitution of "physical presence" in the 1952 statute for
the 1948 requirement of continuous residence may have been responsive to the field officers' complaints, this seems an unnecessary inference. The legislative history is silent on
this point. Id. at 1258 n.6.
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the seven year 'continuous residence requirement' with the current
seven year 'continuous physical presence requirement.' "81
As mentioned above, the legislative history is silent as to the reasons for the replacement of "residence" with "physical presence. 82
The congressional commentary cited by Justice O'Connor appears in
a general description of the revisions in the 1952 reenactment of the
suspension statute in the House Report.8" Justice O'Connor's juxtaposition of this congressional comment, while noting the change in
the statutory language of the residence requirement, yields the impression that Congress had clearly stated its reasons for this particular change.
Furthermore, in support of a legislative intent requiring rigorous
application of the suspension statute as a whole, the Court cites legislative language, which, in the original text of the Senate Report,
refers not to the statute as a whole, but specifically to the substitution of "serious economic detriment" from the
1948 statute with
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." 8 4
81. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 181 (citation omitted).
82. In view of the large scale overhaul of the immigration laws which Congress
had undertaken at the time, the purpose of the language alteration may have been to
avoid confusion between "residence" for the purpose of legal permanent residence and a
statutory period of residence for the purposes of the suspension remedy, which is available to aliens who are not legal permanent residents.
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84. [Congress] made the criteria for suspension of the deportation more stringent
both to restrict the opportunity for discretionary action . . . and to exclude: "Aliens
[who] are deliberately flouting our immigration laws by the processes of gaining admission into the United States illegally or ostensibly as non-immigrants but with the intention of establishing themselves in a situation in which they may subsequently have access
to some administrative remedy to adjust their status to that of permanent residents."
464 U.S. at 189 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 25 (1952)).
The original text of this portion of the report read as follows:
The term "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requires some explanation. The committee is aware that in almost all cases of deportation,
hardship and frequently unusual hardship is experienced by the alien or the
members of his family who may be separated from the alien. The committee is
aware, too, of the progressively increasing number of cases in which aliens are
deliberately flouting our immigration laws by the processes of gaining admission into the United States illegally or ostensibly as nonimmigrants but with
the intention of establishing themselves in a situation in which they may subsequently have access to some administrative remedy to adjust their status to
that of permanent residents. This practice is grossly unfair to aliens who await
their turn on the quota waiting lists and who are deprived of their quota numbers in favor of aliens who indulge in the practice. This practice is threatening
our entire immigration system and the incentive for the practice must be removed. Accordingly, under the bill, to justify the suspension of deportation the
hardship must not only be unusual but must also be exceptionally and extremely unusual. The bill accordingly establishes a policy that the administra-

Finally, it must be noted that the specific requirement to which
this language refers was relaxed by Congress in 1962 to require only
a showing of "extreme hardship" to the alien, or her citizen or legal
permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. 85 That the Court quotes
the restrictive 1952 legislative commentary in support of its strict
reading of section 244(a)(1), and does not address the 1962 liberalization of the requirement to which that commentary referred, constitutes a serious gap in the Court's progression through the legislative
history of the statute. If the restrictive language of 1952 relating to
the hardship requirement supports a restrictive reading of the statute
as a whole, does not the 1962 liberalization of the hardship requirement indicate congressional desire for a more generous reading of
the entire statute from that point onward?
In sum, the selectivity practiced by the Supreme Court in its
patchwork legislative history of section 244(a)(1) creates the impression that the 1952 reenactment derived solely from restrictivist motivation, and that the seven year continuous physical presence requirement resulted directly and expressly from those aims. This approach
generates several criticisms. First, if we view the history of the development of section 244(a)(1) as a whole, including the liberalizing
measures adopted in 1962, it is possible to derive two general legislative sentiments. The entire legislative history of the statute supports
the view that section 244 was created as a humanitarian remedy and
continued as such, with its most severe limitations imposed in 1952.
From the general tone of the statute's 1952 legislative history, it
does indeed seem likely that Congress imposed those limitations to
prevent the abuse of the remedy by aliens who were in deliberate
violation of United States immigration law. This should not imply,
however, that the statute thereby lost its ameliorative force for those
aliens in deserving situations who had not violated United States immigration law. Even if the case of Mrs. Phinpathya was one of an
alien who had illegally circumvented immigration laws and was thus
undeserving of relief, the Court's broad statements in Phinpathya
would deny the humanitarian application of the statute to aliens
whose circumstances lacked the presence of fraud.
A second criticism of the Court's search for legislative intent in
tive remedy should be available only in the very limited category of cases in
which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable. Hardship or even
unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child is not sufficient
to justify suspension of deportation ....
S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 25 (1952).
85. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982). Note that under § 244(a)(2),
aliens deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17) or
(18) of § 241(a) of the Act (concerning crimes of moral turpitude, advocacy of anarchy,
membership in the Communist party and the like) must still meet the burden of proving
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship."
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legislative history concerns the avoidance of any analysis of the specific purpose of the physical presence requirement itself. The Court
seems to move around the issue of the meaning or administrative
value of proof of seven years continuous physical presence. This determinaftion would appear essential to an understanding of the significance of a break in such a period of presence, unless the period of
presence is to be regarded as a technical obstacle of arbitrary length
which an alien seeking suspension must overcome.
The legislative history of section 244(a)(1) does not explicitly
touch upon the specific purpose of the requirement. One might look
for assistance to the purpose behind the five year residency requirement for naturalization.8 6 The House Report states that the purpose
of this five year residency period is "to insure that the alien becomes
thoroughly familiar with the American way of life before receiving
United States citizenship." 87 Thus the residency period for naturalization functions in some sense as a prescribed time-frame for the
alien to adjust and commit to the United States, and as a measuring
stick with which the INS may assure itself that this adjustment has
been accomplished.
If we allow the purposes of the residency requirement for citizenship to lend substance to the presence requirement for suspension, it
seems reasonable to assert that, just as the five year residency requirement serves as a basis for the presumption that the alien has
become accustomed to the American way of life, the physical presence requirement of section 244(a)(1) serves as one indication that
the alien has developed a certain commitment to the United States
through the establishment of roots, communal ties, and expectations.
For the purposes of suspension, the fulfillment demonstrates to the
INS, in a tangible way, that the alien's commitment may be so deep
that it warrants examination to determine whether deportation
would work undue hardship.88 Although the legislative history of section 244(a)(1) neither affirms nor denies the plausibility of such an
interpretation, the interdependency of the presence requirement and
the determination of extreme hardship has met with approval in several circuits and with the BIA. 89
86. INA § 316(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (1982).
87. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1737.
88. See Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Kamheangpatiyooth
v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).

89.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also Heitland v. INS, 551

F.2d 495 (2d. Cir. 1977); McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d. Cir. 1960).

The failure of the Phinpathya Court to address the purpose of the
seven year period of continuous physical presence, or to venture any
interpretation of its significance in relation to the suspension process
as a whole, is likely related to the Court's rejection of an interpretation of section 244(a)(1) which would allow for all but "meaningfully interruptive" absences and which would collapse the seven year
requirement into the extreme hardship requirement.90 Note, here,
the tenuous logical position of the Court. Having supported a strict
reading of the entire statute by citing legislative language referring
to the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard,91 the
Court now insists that each criterion for suspension be read and administered separately. Yet the Court fails to take the next step and
address the specific meaning of the continuous physical presence requirement. Perhaps the Court did not engage in a search for an alternate meaning for the presence requirement because, if it had, it
might have found itself contradicting the premise that the criteria
are not independent. Whatever the motive, the argument that the
continuous physical presence requirement is an isolated threshold
criterion is problematic in that it effectively deprives the requirement
of substantive policy content. Leaving legislative history aside for a
moment, it seems reasonable to assume that the longer the amount
of time an alien has spent in the United States, the more deeply he
has settled into a new life, and the greater the potential hardship
upon deportation. In the Court's interpretation, however, the requirement becomes no more than another hoop through which the alien
seeking suspension must jump.
Statutory Analogy
As further proof of the applicability of the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the Court in Phinpathya compares section 244
to other sections of the INA which set forth periods of residency.
Specifically, the opinion cites former section 301(b) of the INA,
which required two years of presence for the preservation of United
States citizenship, and provided that the continuity of such presence
90. 464 U.S. at 195. The Court stated:
Respondent. . . suggests that we approve the Court of Appeals' articulation
of the "continuous physical presence" standard-that an absence is "meaningfully interruptive" only when it increases the risk and reduces the hardship of
deportation-as consistent with the ameliorative purpose of, and the discretion
of the Attorney General to grant, the suspension remedy [citation omitted].
.. .[T]he liberal interpretation respondent suggests would collapse Section
244(a)(l)'s "continuous physical presence" requirement into an "extreme
hardship" requirement . . . . [They are] separate preconditions for a suspension of deportation [citation omitted]. It strains the statutory language to construe the "continuous physical presence" requirement as requiring yet a further
assessment of hardship.
91. See supra note 84.

[VOL. 23: 401, 1986]

Literalist Statutory Interpretation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

would not be broken by absences of less than an aggregate of-sixty
days.9 2 From provisions of such permissible absences in other statutes which require periods of physical presence, the Court arrives at
the conclusion that the lack of such provisions in section 244(a)(1)
was a "deliberate omission." 93 Thus, the Court reasons, "Congress
meant this 'continuous physical presence' requirement to be administered as written."9 4 While there is some indication in the 1952 legislative history of section 244 that Congress was aware of INS concern over substantial interruptions in the seven year period, 9 5 the
inference that the omission of a similar provision was the result of a
real legislative awareness of and desire for the consequences of a
literal construction in all cases seems hastily drawn. The first obstacle encountered by this type of reasoning is the reality discussed
above that legislatures are not omniscient. Although Congress in
1952 may have been aware of the abuse of granting suspension to an
alien who had been absent two of the seven required years,96 it may
not have foreseen such circumstances as an absence fraudulently induced by the INS, 97 or a one month absence during a period of legal
nonimmigrant status to visit a dying family member.98 Even those
who support restrictive statutory interpretation would agree that the
interpretation of a statute, however strict, should avoid results "too
irrational to square with the statutory scheme." 98
Additionally, the Court's use of this type of analogy draws attention not to the substantive content of the statutes compared, but
rather to the literal language of each statute and to the conspicuous
absence of certain words. Thus, the focus once more becomes the
words of the statute at the time enacted.
92. 464 U.S. at 189-90 (citing 86 Stat. 1289, repealing 71 Stat. 644).
93. Id. at 190.
94. Id.

95. See supra note 80.
96. id.

97. See McLeod, 283 F.2d at 186. The court stated, "[w]hile it is true that the
statutory language does not admit of flexibility in this matter, on its face it seems clear
that circumstances can be suggested where an absence of even several years would not
prevent an alien from being continuously physically present."
98. See Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (1st Cir. 1979).
99. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (referring to interpretation of the definition of the term "entry"). See also F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, The Sixth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Delivered
Before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 13 (March 18, 1947). "A judge
must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it ....
He must not read
it by way of creation ....
He must read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal
contradiction."

It is interesting to note that the technique of statutory analogy
may be used in an alternate way, one which looks to similar statutes
not for the presence or absence of certain words, but rather in search
of a broader congressional or majoritarian policy in order to extend
such policy to an under-inclusive statute. This approach forgoes the
particulars of legislative intent at a certain time point in relation to
individual similar statutes. Rather, it favors a unifying concept
which makes sense of the statutes in light of their entire legislative
and judicial development and illuminates their applicability to present-day circumstances. The latter approach examines statutes as
"sources of law, statements of policy extensible to modern
problems."1 00
The use of statutory analogy for generative purposes was demonstrated by Justice Harlan in his opinion in Moragne v. States
10 2
Marine Lines, Inc.101 In an 1886 case, The Harrisburg,
the Supreme Court had ruled that there was no remedy provided by general maritime law for death on the navigable waters of a state. In
Moragne, Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous court, overruled
The Harrisburg,pointing out that every state had since enacted a
wrongful death statute, and Congress had since enacted the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA)1 °3 for wrongful death of railroad
employees, the Jones Act for merchant seamen, and the Death on
the High Seas Act for persons on the high seas. "These numerous
and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole, make it clear that
there is no present
public policy against allowing recovery for wrong1 0°4
ful death.
It is true that the statutory controversy in Phinpathya does not
precisely parallel that of Moragne. In Moragne, the statutes, the collective policy of which warranted a remedy for the excluded tort,
had been enacted over a long period of time, by different legislatures
in response to various problems. The development of these tort remedies suggests that the lack of a statute for wrongful death in navigable waters was more likely due to the fact that the specific problem
had not yet come before state legislatures, than due to deliberate
omission. In Phinpathya, however, the statute in question and the
concern over abuse of that statute was considered by Congress during a large overhaul of the immigration laws in 1952. At that time,
residence requirements were enacted which allowed for absences; the
100. Note, supra note 54, at 893 (citation omitted).
101. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
102. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
103. For an examination of FELA and the recommended repeal of this statute, see
Schwartz, The Federal Employers' Liability Act, A Bane For Workers, A Bust for Railroads, A Boon for Lawyers, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1 (1985).
104. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 390.
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physical presence requirement of section 244(a)(1), however, was enacted without such a provision. Moreover, there is some indication
that the problem of excessive absences during the seven year period
required for suspension did come to the attention of Congress at that
time.1 0 5 Thus, while there seemed to be nothing which impeded Justice Harlan's inference of a public policy warranting a wrongful
death action for navigable waters, the inference of a clear public policy permitting reasonable absences in all required periods of residence is more difficult to draw.
There are, however, important .general lessons to be learned from
Justice Harlan's reasoning in Moragne. Commenting upon the legitimacy of his approach in light of legislative reality, Justice Harlan
stated: "In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing
more than the dimensions of the particular problem that came to the
attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that the legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which the mischief is identical." 10 8
Statutes with similar purposes need not be used solely for literal
comparisons; they also represent legislative statements from which a
Court may derive "the residual principle in legislation that should be
given effect in circumstances not covered by the express statutory
terms . . . .110 In regard to section 244(a)(1), comparisons with
other residency or physical presence provisions in the INA which do
allow absences would be useful to discern the purpose of the seven
year continuous physical presence requirement,0 " and to decide the
validity of allowing for nonexcessive absences in light of that purpose. The Court might have thereby used statutory analogy to fill,
rather than widen, the gap created by the absence of explanation of
section 244(a)(1)'s purpose, as illustrated earlier in the comparison
of the residence requirement for naturalization and section
244(a)(1).
The Problematic Nature of the "PlainMeaning" Model
The revival of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius as
a mode of analysis for section 244(a)(1) obscures rather than clarifies the significance of the continuous physical presence requirement.
105. See supra note 80.
106. 398 U.S. at 392.
107. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 347 n.2 (1970)
concurring).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13.

(Harlan, J.,

The use of literal words of section 244(a)(1) as a basis for establishing the "clear intent" of Congress removes from the statute its function as a source of policy in human circumstances; it instead views
the statute as confined by the most simple meaning of its own words
and by legislative commentary at the time of reenactment in 1952.
When the Court confines itself to the "plain meaning" of a statute, two immediate results are foreseeable, in terms of the type of
judicial opinion which will result. If, as in the case of Phinpathya,
the Court wishes the statute to stand as it is, circumstances unforeseen by the legislature, as well as changes in policy over the passage
of time, will remain unaddressed; the statute will continue to be underinclusive. If, on the other hand, the Court seeks to reinterpret a
statute, the desire to adhere to the "plain meaning" of the words
may force the Court into distortion of the statutory language.
An example of this second possibility can be found in the Rosenberg v. Fleuti0 9 opinion. In Fleuti, the Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether a legal permanent resident's return after a oneday trip across the Mexican border constituted "entry" within the
definition set forth in section 101(a)(13),11 ° such that the alien could
be excludable for a condition existing at the time of return. In enacting section 101(a)(13) in 1952, Congress had added a moderating
provision in order to protect unsuspecting aliens who had involuntarily left the United States from the harsh and irrational hazards of
strict application of the term "entry."
Although in 1952 Congress had only considered the difficulties
faced by those aliens whose absences were involuntary,"" the Fleuti
Court stated: "Nevertheless, it requires but brief consideration of the
policies underlying section 101(a)(13), and of certain other aspects
of the rights of returning resident aliens, to conclude that Congress
. . . could not have meant to limit the meaning of the exceptions it
'
created in section 101(a)(13) to [cases of involuntary absences]. ' "12

Further, the court stated that: "We conclude, then, that it effectuates congressionalpurpose to construe the intent exception to Section 101(a)(13) as meaning an intent to depart in a manner which
can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence."'13
Because of its goals of reinterpreting the statute while respecting
the primacy of legislative language, the Court in Fleuti resorts to an
explanation of what Congress must have meant in 1952, and to a

text.

109. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
110. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1982). See supra note 18 for
111.

See supra note 26.

112. 374 U.S. at 458.
113. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
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questionable stretching of the word "intent." The Fleuti Court might
have avoided this distortion of meaning by confronting the purpose
of the statutory exception for involuntary departures, and deciding
that a short interruption in residence, although intended, could, in
certain circumstances, be as nonthreatening to the permanence of an
alien's stay as an unintended, involuntary absence.
It is important to see the interrelation between the two types of
statute-confined decisionmaking illustrated by Phinpathya and
Fleuti. A decision which reinterprets or enlarges the reach of a state
by manipulating its words or rearranging its history makes it an easier task for a court to later return to a restrictive interpretation by
citing the literal language of the statute, never having to confront its
purpose. Since, in the first case, the policy reasons for the change in
light of present-day circumstances might never be addressed honestly, they need not be confronted when a court later returns to a
restrictive reading.
Consider the following: Suppose the Fleuti Court had felt the freedom to acknowledge that Congress, when it liberalized section
101(a)(13) in 1952, did not even consider the case of an innocent,
brief, but voluntary absence during legal permanent residence. Instead of concluding that Congress could not have meant to exclude
it, the Court leaves this point aside, and discerns in the actual liberalization of the statute the broad congressional policy of protecting
aliens from the unsuspected risks of innocent departure. If the Court
found that policy in tune with present-day legal and political thinking, it could openly apply the policy even though, at the time it was
conceived, it was only meant for a narrow class of aliens. In later
years, a Court wishing to restrict the applicability of the statute
would then be forced to confront the actual policy and articulate its
reasons for new restrictions.
The approach of the Court in Phinpathya raises deeper questions
regarding a literalist Court's view of its role and the role of the legislature. One writer has suggested that the persistence of the Court in
its "clear statement" model of statutory interpretation implies an institution lamenting its own judicial incompetence.11 4 It professes
"complete judicial paralysis" unless Congress speaks clearly and addresses every possible consequence of a statute at the time of enactment. Yet while the Court asserts that the congressional "no trespassing" sign prevents it from "tampering and policy repair, 11 5 it is
114.

Note, supra note 54, at 902.

115.

Id.

the Court which is actually restricting the Congress. By keeping legislative intent a prisoner of time, and a statute a prisoner of words,
the Court implicitly suggests that Congress is incapable of enacting
legislation which incorporates broader, far-reaching policy goals. Instead, the literalist approach perceives Congress as a body which
acts only in response to particular situations without any overarching
conception of the structure and aims of an entire body of laws, such
as the Immigration and Nationality Act as a whole. Moreover, the
Court's refusal to actively interpret a statute may imply a vision of
legislative politics wherein the legislation, which is a product of Congress' "situational reaction," is not even based upon a sense of
majoritarian values, but rather upon compromises concluded by various interest groups:
In the pluralist society, the only shared values are those that
emerge-through a sort of natural selection-from the legislative battleground .... It is not for the Court to question results that appear harsh,
incongruous, or even inexplicable; who knows what interest group wrested
those results from a perhaps distracted Congress, what logrolling transpired
to yield up those outcomes?""6

Thus, in the superficial deference to the primacy of legislative
goals as expressed in statutory words, the Court actually disempowers Congress by refusing to interpret congressional words as
those of a far-sighted policy-making body. The rejection of the interpretive function is also a disempowerment of the Court itself. The
Court's refusal to recognize statutes as sources of broader policy
statements obstructs the "extra-legislative growth" ' of legislative
mandates, a process for which we traditionally and legitimately rely
upon the courts, once the legislature has spoken. Moreover, a shirking of the interpretive role through the "clear statement" model of
statutory construction does not merely freeze statutory development;
it forces such development to take several steps backward in time,
since it confines legislative intent to the enactment. Because "clear
statement tethers subsequent judicial freedom through doctrines of
interpretation that become rules of clear statement"11 8 (as one might
appreciate from the discussion of Fleuti and Phinpathya), literalist
statutory interpretations put into continuous judicial practice underdeveloped policies or legislative intent which may not reflect the values of the present majority.
The Court's choice of a model of statutory interpretation is to be
judged by the effectiveness with which that model legitimates the
exercise of legislative power.119 This, in turn, depends upon the abil116.
117.
118.
119.

Note, supra note 54, at 900-01 (citations omitted).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 903-04.
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ity of the model to realistically "account for deficiencies in congressional ability to achieve valid legislative ends"' 120 and to enable a
court to perform a critical function in regard to the substance of
these ends. 12 ' The literalist approach fails in the first function because it asks Congress to reconsider legislation repeatedly, an unrealistic demand in view of the general burden of legislative concerns. As Wellington and Albert point out, "[tihe reasons for
legislative inaction are numerous and have nothing whatever to do
with a preference for one result or another in the particular case
before a court."' 22 Yet this process yields a substantive policy decision without an explicit consideration of the substantive policy of
Congress by the Court.123
Moreover, with regard to the second function-the "critical capacity'n 24-- the literalist approach is incapable of evaluating the substantive policy decision it has made. The PhinpathyaCourt explicitly
acknowledges this limitation when it cites Jay v. Boyd for the proposition that the plain language of the statute must be applied "however severe the consequences." 1 25 However,
[c]ritical review ... would not require the Court to reconsider the substantive wisdom of congressional choices, nor would it require the Court to dis-

approve every inequity resulting from a statute's enforcement. A critical

judicial role does demand, however, that the Court approve only those harsh

results inevitably attendant on specifically chosen policies. Arbitrary harm
unnecessarily imposed on individuals cannot be legitimated."'1 8

The Phinpathya decision puts the actual effect of the "clear statement" model in a particularly ironic light. Judicial decisions in the
area of immigration law have continually made reference to the
binding nature of Congress' plenary power over immigration. 27 The
Phinpathya decision, while deferring superficially to this power, actually wrests the far-reaching potential of this power from congressional hands. If a fair reading of the entire legislative development of
section 244(a)(1) creates the impression of a dual congressional
aim-to relieve the harsh consequences of deportation of an alien of
long residence and in good standing, while denying relief to aliens in
deliberate violation of the law-then the Court has taken from the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Wellington & Albert, supra note 58, at 1552 (citation omitted).
Note, supra note 54, at 906.
Id. at 904.
Phinpathya,464 U.S. at 192 (citing Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357 (1956)).
Note, supra note 54, at 905.
See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977).

Attorney General his congressionally delegated power to invoke the
ameliorative purposes of 244(a)(1) in a range of situations. In the
guise of judicial submissiveness, the Court has taken an activist
stand with regard to the remedy of suspension of deportation. Yet
this judicial activism serves to disempower both Congress and the
Court itself.
THE "COMMON LAW" MODEL OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

An Overview
Several legal thinkers in recent years have grappled with the problem of literalist statutory interpretation and its avoidance of honest
confrontation with underlying policy. Justice Harlan's use of statutes
as generative of policy, as in Moragne, and in the case of Welsh v.
United States,128 has had a deep effect upon the consideration of this
issue by scholars. Senator Jack Davies of Minnesota credits to the
reasoning of Justice Harlan his own theory of the nonprimacy of
statutes.129 In 1979 Senator Davies proposed a Nonprimacy of Statutes Act for adoption by the Minnesota legislature.130
128. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). Welsh, a conscientious objector during the Vietnam War, felt that he could not sign the statement in the Selective Service Conscientious
Objector Application: "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Selective Service Act of 1948, ch.
625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948). He struck out the words "my religious training and,"
and signed the form. 398 U.S. at 345. The language establishing conscientious objector
status read:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this
connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely a personal moral code.
Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948).
Four justices found that Welsh was covered by this exemption by twisting the language of the Act. Three other justices read the statute literally and found that Welsh
was not covered. Justice Harlan, writing alone, found that Congress' intent to exempt
only religious objectors was clear, but violated the first amendment. At this point, Justice
Harlan faced two possibilities: strike down the exemption, or extend it to cover those, like
Welsh, who should have been included. He decided to repair the underinclusive statute
because of Congress' broad policy of granting conscientious objector status to those who
held sincere anti-war beliefs. He thus concurred in the result, "not as a matter of statutory construction but as the touchstone for salvaging a congressional policy of long-standing that would otherwise have to be nullified." 398 U.S. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
129. Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescene: The Nonprimacy of Statutes
Act, 4 VER. L. REv. 203, 206 (1979).
130. Minnesota Senate File 557, House File 1437 (1979). See Davies, supra note
129, at 204-05 n.7.
Under this bill each statute matures, twenty years after its enactment, into
something comparable to a principle of common law. The bill declares legislative enactments at their twenty year "maturity" to be subject in litigated cases
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It is interesting to note that, aside from the difficulties examined
in the previous section's analysis of Phinpathya,Senator Davies sees
in statutory primacy the problem of the unavailability of the courts
to the individual citizen as a forum for change. This is inherent in a
court's refusal to go further than the literal words of Congress:
When the adverse rule is statutory. . . the client must be dismissed by the
availability of the legislative institution as a handy scapegoat. The mechanism of law reformation through adjudication practically drops from the
picture once the legislature acts on a body of law. What vanishes is 31the
power to appeal to the judiciary for legal change. This power is vital.2

In his recent book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,3 2
Guido Calabresi proposes a wholly judicial alternative to Senator
Davies' statutory remedy. In his criticism of such "sunset statutes,"
Calabresi notes:
[S]unset does not guarantee either that a current majority will rule or that

only anachronistic laws will fail to be re-enacted. It only deprives a past
majority of the benefit of [legislative inertia] and gives it to those who ob-

ject to the laws. Since regulatory laws age at different rates and in different
ways, a system that invalidates such laws with clockwork regularity gives a
tremendous weapon to those who oppose regulation itself; the force of inertia shifts to their side . .

.

.The point is, in the end, quite simple. Time

of age either in all statutes generally or in
does not serve as a good indicator
regulatory ones in particular.113

Calabresi's own proposal would give courts the power to treat statutes in the same way they treat the common law. In Calabresi's
model, courts could "alter a written law or some part of it in the
same way. . . in which they can modify or abandon a common law
13 4
doctrine or even a whole complex set of interrelated doctrines.
Although both Calabresi and Davies center their theories upon the
problem of statutory obsolescence, the substance of their models of
to the judicial scrutiny accorded judicial precedents; that is, they can be limited, extended, qualified, and even overruled by courts. Freed from the doctrine
of legislative primacy, courts will be expected to respond both to the demands
of justice presented by litigating advocates, and to authority drawn from other
legislation, from judicial precedents, from scholarly studies, and from Brandeis
briefs. Courts are asked to do justice for the litigants guided by general legal
principles and by the facts of the case. The court will also follow the statute in
issue to the extent it continues to have logical legitimacy. In the adjudication of
a case, when a court finds it necessary to modify a statute pursuant to the
Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, the court's decision becomes a precedent in the
common law tradition. The law, though enacted as legislation, is changed by
the court's decision.

Id. at 205.
131. Id. at 213.
132. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11.
133. Id. at 61-62.
134. Id. at 82.

interpretation provides general guidance for the process of bringing
any statute in line with the present-day legal, political, and social
landscape.
Central to Calabresi's model of "common law" interpretation is
the abandonment of judicial subterfuges. 135 Instead of relying on this
ruse, courts could openly state that a statute does not fit the prevailing principles of present-day majoritarian values: "An honest recognition that sometimes interpretation is appropriately shaped by ends
other than the desire to conform to legislative intent is very different
from a sly refusal to follow such intent even though it can be
discerned."1 38
In the "common law" model, a court would have the freedom to
consider statutes as "consensually agreed-upon principles" 13 7 and to
use their generative potential. Further, Calabresi maintains that the
power to treat statutes this way would not effect a deep change in
the nature of the judicial task of treating "like cases alike":
In seeking to apply that framework to new circumstances, each judge inevitably brings to the task some sense of the majority that selected him or her
and some sense of what is right for the country, and this, together with the
fact that what the "like" case is depends on the level of generality at which
one asks the question helps the fabric to change. If the object is to treat like
cases alike, to adapt to changed technologies and ideologies, and to reflect
the evolving values of a people, why should the input be only that of previous common law cases? Statutes, no less than common law decisions, reflect
changes in underlying popular attitudes. The gravitational force of such
statutes should surely affect courts seeking to keep their map current."3 8

Hence, statutes are allowed an "evolution" and an integration into
a present legal, political and social landscape. A further implication
of this approach is the open abandonment of legislative intent as a
time-bound phenomenon. Calabresi maintains that the connection
between legislative history and the current function of a statute is
nonexistent.1 39
A more moderate solution than that posed by Calabresi might use
legislative history, like statutes, as a source of information. Just as
statutes are viewed as generative of policy, legislative history would
be read as a source of majoritarian values and goals; not in the at135. Id.
136. Id. at 38.
137. Note, supra note 54, at 913.
138. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 97-98.
Why should the ambiguity of words and of initial legislative intent have
more than a purely causal connection with the position a statute has in the
current fabric of the law? And why should those limits ...

Id.

which would fol-

low from an honest adherence to the limited meaning that words have, be at all
appropriate? Why should they not frequently be too restrictive and, at other
times, be inappropriately broad?
139. Id.
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tempt to justify application of the statute's literal meaning, but
rather, in order to determine whether, and in what way, those goals
fit in the present scenario.
The "common law" model of statutory interpretations poses
deeper questions about the role of judicial power: Do we wish to enable judges to evolve statutory laws in this way? What, then, qualifies a judge for such a role? Moreover, what will be the effect of
such a model upon the traditional conception of the separation of
powers?
Calabresi argues that the "legal fabric and the principles that
form it" are very good indications of the majoritarian will. 140 He
views the legal landscape as a slowly developing reflection of popular
values as perceived and applied by many individual judges. If this
is an appropriate starting point for discerning the wishes of the majority, then it seems natural to enable judges to develop statutory law
from principles, since "principled decision-making
within a legal
142
landscape is the primary judicial task."
Furthermore, the common law model would give courts the freedom to search for and make use of a wider range of indicators of
popular values in the legal landscape, some not traditionally used in
judicial decisions. With regard to the statute itself, a court could
consider the age of the statute, the consequences of different interpretations,1 43 and the statute's development in the common law. Further, Calabresi suggests that the court's field of examination need
not be limited to the statute: "Scholarly criticisms (both in law and
derived from such related fields as philosophy, economics, and political science), jury actions that nullify or mitigate past rules, even administrative determinations, all can be appropriate reports of change
1 44
in the landscape in response to changed beliefs or conditions."
In the end, Calabresi maintains, courts which implement the
"common law" model will not be doing anything radically different
from that which they do today,145 except that the judicial subterfuges would fall away.148 This implies, however, that a court wishing
to reinterpret a statute will have an easier time of it as long as the
court can openly point to the changes in the legal landscape which
140. Id. at 96-97.
141.

Id. at 97.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 96.
Note, supra note 54, at 914.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 98.
Id.
Id. at 82.

warrant updating. A court which seeks to retain a statute's literal
meaning, however, will no longer be able to rely upon the words of
the statute and its legislative history. While these tools of interpretation may not be "subterfuges" in the true sense of the word, they
often divert attention from substantive issues of policy and purpose,
as in the Phinpathya decision. Under the "common law" model, a
court with retentionist goals would be forced to confront these issues
and explain the reasons for the policy implemented by its reading of
the statute, in terms of majoritarian values as reflected in the general legal and legislative fabric. In this sense, a court which adopts a
"common law" model of interpretation is more likely to be implementing legislative or majoritarian will than ignoring it. 47 Because
courts interpreting statutes will be asked to articulate the factors
which underlie their decisions, they will have to perceive popular values carefully and with deliberation rather than institute policies of
their own.
If, under the "common law" approach to statutory interpretation,
judges would do no more than perform their judicial task, in open
adherence to both legislative will and popular values, it does not appear that a radical change in the balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary would be effected. Indeed, as we suggested
earlier, the active interpretation of the words of the legislature in
application to particular cases has been the traditional function of
the judiciary. Such a role is no more than that perceived by Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. ' 48
Furthermore, the legislature remains the institution of last resort
if a court misconstrues the legal landscape, or abuses its task. It may
be argued, however, that a quick legislative response is more likely to
occur when a court "remands" a statute to the legislature by giving
it a strict interpretation. One danger of this approach, however, is
that in so demonstrating to the legislature the problematic nature of
the statute, the court may impose harsh or irrational results upon the
litigants involved. If a court can instead reinterpret or revise a statute in accordance with its perception of current values, the burden of
"legislative inertia" 149 shifts to those who wish to retain older policies, or to those who believe that the court's perception is mistaken.
Thus, change is recommended (and effected) without the perpetuation in the case before the court of a legislative policy which the
147. Note, supra note 54, at 914.
148. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 177 (1803).
149. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 179.
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court finds questionable or unduly harsh.
The "Common Law" Model Applied
How might the Court have implemented aspects of the "common
law" model to decide the Phinpathya case? As a preliminary step in
the analysis, the Court would attempt to discern the general purpose
of the suspension statute. Of course, one's first impulse is to read the
statute's legislative history-but in doing so it is important to remember that the answer is not to be found in the pages of The Congressional Record. Rather, the history serves us in furnishing information about the substantive policy origins of the statute. As
mentioned in the first section of this Article, the legislative development of section 244 of the INA reveals two major congressional concerns: the need for an avenue of relief from deportation for "meritorious cases" of aliens who had lived in the United States as lawabiding citizens and developed roots in the community, 150 and the
desire for some reasonable limits on the remedy to prevent aliens
from deliberately abusing United States immigration laws in order
to request suspension. 151 The next step might be an evaluation of the
extent to which each of these concerns are carried out in the evaluation of requests for suspension both at the administrative level, in the
BIA, and in the courts. Is the restrictivist aspect of the statute outweighed by its ameliorative purposes in present-day practice? How
do courts strike a balance between the two concerns? What substantive limits have been, or should be imposed upon the remedy? The
issue of Mrs. Phinpathya's fraudulent concealment of her husband's
nonstudent status at the United States Consul in Thailand enters
into consideration at this point. Does the notion of discouraging violation of United States immigration laws indicate that aliens who reenter the United States under fraudulent circumstances should not
be eligible for suspension of deportation? This might be a plausible
way of balancing the two congressional concerns expressed in the
legislative history of section 244. Is this type of limitation on the
remedy supported by other decisions in the field of immigration
law152 or by public policy? Here, the Court might look to other stat150.

81 CONG. REC. H5551 (daily ed. June 10, 1937) (statement of Rep.

Sirovich).

151. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. pt. 1, 25 (1952).
152. See Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977) (fraudulent circumstances

of alien's return to the United States after an absence of six weeks, coupled with the

illegality of the alien's presence in the United States "meaningfully interrupted" continuous physical presence.) But cf. deGallardo v. INS, 642 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980) (alien

utory remedies in the INA where fraud upon entry may be a bar to
relief. For example, the Attorney General may deny asylum under
section 208 of the INA 5 3 where the alien made misrepresentations
to gain entry to the United States.154 A comparison of the purposes
of, and of the type of relief granted by sections 208 and 244 might
yield some indication of whether fraudulent entry should bar relief
under the suspension statute. For example, consideration of a fraudulent entry, in the case of asylum, or a fraudulent reentry, in the
case of suspension, may be warranted because of the generous and
permanent nature of the relief afforded by both statutes: adjustment
of status to that of a legal permanent resident.
An essential part of the Court's analysis should focus upon the
specific purpose of section 244(a)(1)'s continuous physical presence
requirement in order to determine whether this purpose was violated
by Mrs. Phinpathya's absence. Here again, the technique of statutory analogy, using statutes as generative of principles, would be
helpful. A comparison of section 244(a)(1) with other sections of the
INA requiring residency periods might assist the court in resolving
the question of whether the continuous physical presence requirement ought to be read as a threshold requirement separate from
"hardship" and "good moral character," or as a time-frame upon
which these requirements depend. To what extent, if any, do the
length and purpose of Mrs. Phinpathya's absence bear upon her eligibility for relief, in view of the purposes of section 244? What is the
effect of the fraud upon Mrs. Phinpathya's adherence to the purposes of the presence requirement?
In this regard, the Court might examine the way in which suspension claims are evaluated by immigration judges and by the BIA.
The Court could in this manner, discern current attitudes toward the
suspension remedy where that remedy is considered and applied on a
more widespread basis than on the judicial level. The Court should
determine whether eligibility is dependent upon the strict fulfillment
of the three requirements, or whether the borders between the three
requirements should be permitted to merge to create a complete picture of the alien's life in the United States. Moreover, the Court
should ask itself which style of deliberation fits more comfortably
with the general purpose of the remedy, as determined in the first
step of the analysis. The question of whether the continuous physical
presence requirement should be collapsed into the hardship requirewho interrupted a 10-year physical presence with a three-and-a-half month vacation to
Honduras and Mexico held not to have "meaningfully interrupted" the physical presence
despite the fact that she had obtained permission to reenter on the pretext that she intended to stay only a few days).
153. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
154. See In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982).
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ment has also received a great deal of attention from circuit courts
of appeals.155 The Court should examine these cases as an indication
of the way in which the suspension statute has been woven into the
"legal fabric" of current immigration policy.
In its "common law" consideration of the suspension statute's continuous physical presence requirement, the Court may also wish to
examine the effect of both liberal and restrictive readings upon Attorney General discretion with regard to the remedy. Would a liberal
reading of the statute's requirements give the Attorney General overbroad discretion in suspension claims? Would such discretion require
relief to be granted in too many cases where relief is unwarranted, 158
or would it merely empower the Attorney General to review each
57
case on its merits and decide whether relief should be granted?
Finally, if it is part of the judicial task to sense the majoritarian
will in the current legal, political and social landscape, the court in
its assessment of section 244(a)(1) would have to give due regard to
ascertainable sentiment of Congress. Has Congress passed any laws
in recent years indicating concern about aliens in hardship situations? What influence, if any, should the 1962 liberalization of section 244(a)(1)'s hardship requirement have upon the reading of the
continuous physical presence requirements? Has Congress expressed
concern over the deliberate violation of United States immigration
law by aliens seeking relief? The preceding represent suggestions for
alternative methods of deciding a case like Phinpathya.It is not the
goal of this inquiry to assert that the decision should have yielded a
different result. It is conceivable that, after careful consideration of
some of the enumerated factors, the Supreme Court would have arrived at the same result in Phinpathya and would have denied relief.
That conclusion, however, would have been more solidly anchored in
a conception of the current legal, political and social landscape in
the area of immigration law and policy. As long as the Court's conception of this landscape remains unarticulated, obscured by "ordinary meaning" and "legislative intent," we will lack a necessary un155. See McColvin v. INS, 148 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1981); Kamheangpatiyooth v.
INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977).
156.

T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 487

(1985) report that from 1977 to 1980, only 120 aliens were granted suspension of deportation. This was during a time when, at least in some jurisdictions, the "continuous physical presence" requirement was given a generous interpretation. Thus, it does not seem
that such an interpretation would give rise to a great influx of aliens who are all receiving
relief under § 244. The court using its "common law" model may wish to take this fact
into account. Id.
157. Kamheangpatiyooth, 597 F.2d at 1256 n.3.

derstanding of the basis of judicial opinions and their function in
relation to substantive legislative policy.
THE AFTERMATH OF Phinpathya

The Supreme Court's strict reading of section 244(a)(1) in
Phinpathya leaves us with a remedy from which much of the substantive content has been drained. Under a generous reading of the
statute, it was possible to use the three requirements-good moral
character, continuous physical presence, and extreme hardship-as
interdependent factors to create a broad picture of the alien's life in
the United States and to determine eligibility. If there were absences
in the period of continuous physical presence, they might be overlooked if they were not significant enough to lessen the alien's hardship in abandoning the United States. Furthermore, if the object of
the statute is to aid certain aliens who have, over a long period of
time, adjusted to an American lifestyle and conducted themselves
like residents or citizens, it seems only fair to allow these aliens the
same insignificant leaves of absence which Americans themselves
take without intending to abandon their homes.
Under the Court's reading of section 244(a)(1), the requirements
become threshold criteria to be viewed in isolation. In this context,
the purpose of the continuous physical presence requirement remains
unclear. It takes on the feeling of a magical condition of arbitrary
length, which an alien must fulfill precisely in order to be granted
her wish. Contrary to the original remedial intent of the suspension
statute, the Court's construction of section 244(a)(1) appears to create a barrier to be overcome by aliens, rather than an avenue of
relief.
Moreover, the Court's literalist reading of the continuous physical
presence requirement has affected the way in which the other criteria of section 244 have been read. In Zamora-Garciav. INS,158 the
Fifth Circuit held that, in considering the hardship of deportation to
an alien who had been living with an American family for fourteen
years, the BIA need not consider the hardship to the children of the
family, since they were not the alien's United States citizen or legal
permanent resident children, as specified in section 244(a)(1). The
Court stated:
Although the Supreme Court's ruling [in Phinpathya] only specifically

has an impact upon the "continuous physical presence" requirement,
we-without deciding-have doubts that the Court would approach the
"extreme hardship" requirement any differently. We therefore recognize-although perhaps reluctantly-that the Board need not consider the
hardship to the Chrisma children posed by the possibility of [Zamora-Gar158. 737 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1984).
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cia's] deportation. 159

In the main, however, INS v. Wang, 60° in which the Supreme
Court upheld the discretion of the Attorney General to define the
term "extreme hardship" and construe it narrowly "should he deem
it wise to do so, " 61 continues to control the interpretation of the
extreme hardship requirement. Circuit courts have elaborated upon
Wang, limiting the decision to the Attorney General's discretion to
substantively define "extreme hardship;" the Attorney General must,
according to these cases, perform a procedurally complete evaluation
of the alien's hardship claim, giving due consideration to each element of the alien's case, examining these elements cumulatively, so
as to understand the alien's circumstances in the aggregate. The Attorney General
must also articulate the reasons for his findings in
16 2
each case.
The broad statements in the Phinpathya case seem to defy such
limitation by the lower courts. Because the Phinpathya ruling relates
more directly to the general construction of the continuous physical
presence requirement of section 244(a)(1) than to the specific facts
of Mrs. Phinpathya's case, it would appear that an alien with an
absence of any length, however small and for whatever reason, is
now without remedy under the suspension statute.16 3
Charles Gordon, one of the authors of the treatise Immigration
Law and Procedure,6 4 suggests that the only alternative for an attorney who must argue a suspension claim where the alien has interrupted her presence, would be to view the Court's broad statements
as dicta.' 65 Indeed, if the alien's absence was nonfraudulent or had
occurred during a period of legal nonimmigrant status, this may be a
viable option. One might assert that the legislative history of section
244 demonstrates congressional concern over deserving hardship
cases, as well as over abuse of United States law. Thus, the Supreme
Court's denial of suspension of deportation to Mrs. Phinpathya on
the basis of her fraudulent reentry should not bar relief to aliens
whose absences are not deliberate violations of law. These deserving
159.
160.
161.
162.
1352 (9th
163.
164.
AND

Id. at 494.
450 U.S. 139 (1981).
Id. at 145.
See Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d
Cir. 1980).
See Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 196 (Brennan, J., concurring).
C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12.
165. Telephone interview with Charles Gordon, co-author of IMMIGRAON LAW
PROCEDURE (Mar. 20, 1985).

cases where the alien has remained a law-abiding member of society,
but for an initial illegal entry or an overstay of a visa, were indeed
the primary object of congressional concern in its enunciation of the
remedy in statutory form. Thus, it may be possible to limit
Phinpathya to situations in which absences were taken illegally or
under fraudulent circumstances. Such a limitation would still exclude a broad class of aliens whose original entry into the United
States was illegal and who, because of their illegal status, had no
choice but to exit and reenter illegally or fraudulently, if they wished
or needed to leave the United States. On the other other hand, this
limitation would lessen the general severity of the Phinpathya decision and bring the ruling more in line with Fleuti and its progeny,
which imply that return after an absence for noninnocent purposes
or under illegal circumstances should be regarded as an "entry"
under section 101(a) (13) of the Act, and that such an absence constitutes a "meaningful interruption" in the period of continuous
physical presence for the purposes of section 244(a)(1).111
There is also an argument to be made to the effect that
Phinpathya actually conflicts with Wang, which granted the Attorney General wide discretion to define "extreme hardship":
The crucial question in this case is what constitutes "extreme hardship".
These words are not self-explanatory and reasonable men can differ as to
their construction. But the Act commits their definition in the first instance
to the Attorney General and his delegates, and their construction and applisimcation of this standard should not be overturned by a reviewing1 court
ply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute. , 7

The holding of Phinpathya restricts the discretion of the Attorney
General and his delegates in the application of the continuous presence requirement, and may thus, in a sense, restrict Attorney General discretion with regard to the administration of the statute as a
whole. It is, however, doubtful that such an argument could be made
with any degree of success. The combined effect of Phinpathya and
Wang, despite the apparent inconsistency, is the very restrictive
reading of the suspension statute as a whole: under Wang, the Attorney General was given broad discretion to interpret the extreme
hardship requirement narrowly, 6 ' and in Phinpathya,the Attorney
General is given "discretion" to interpret the continuous physical
presence requirement according to the literal meaning of the statute.
In this respect, the Court's decision in Phinpathya not only limits its
own interpretive role and disempowers Congress in its policy-making
role, it also ties the hands of the agency which is to carry out a
legislatively mandated function.
166. See supra notes 12-53 and accompanying text.
167. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1980).
168. Id. at 145.
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Finally, it is important to note that five months after the
Phinpathyadecision, Representative Roybal of California introduced

an amendment to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill to add the following paragraph to section 244 of the INA: "An alien shall not be considered
to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United
States

. .

.if the absence from the United States did not meaning-

fully interrupt the continuous physical presence."'" 9 The amendment

was adopted by a vote of 411 to 4, but was subsequently lost with

the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation. It is unclear what weight this lost
amendment would carry as an argument in a suspension case. The
amendment, and the congressional commentary which surrounds it,
certainly constitute some reflection of popular values (especially in
light of the almost unanimous approval it received in the House).
However, until the legislature is able to pass an amendment concerning its preferred construction of section 244(a)(1), if the Roybal
Amendment is a reflection of present-day majoritarian will through
legislative intent, it will remain obscured by the literal reading of the

suspension statute embodied in the Phinpathya decision.

169. 130 CONG. REc. H5808-09 (daily ed. June 14, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Roybal). During the debate on this amendment, Representative Roybal stated:
To be eligible for suspension of deportation an individual must prove continuous physical presence in the United States for a period of seven years. This
amendment would clarify that the requirements allow brief absences during
this seven year period; that is, absences that do not meaningfully interrupt the
continuous physical presence.
Now, the reason for that is to express the intent of Congress that the requirement not be literally or strictly construed in light of the recent Supreme
Court opinion that did so. The practical result of the Supreme Court's opinion
is to nullify the suspension of deportation provision, a result that the Congress
could not have intended.
The more personal result is that the long-time residents of this country are
being denied legal status unfairly on the grounds that they may have only
[W]hat we are dobriefly made an innocent trip to outside the borders ....
ing with this amendment is simply clarifying the matter and making it quite
clear that it is the intent of Congress to make it possible for an individual to be
able to physically leave the country in a temporary way and that absence not
be a meaningful interruption of his continuous physical presence.
Representative Frank of Massachusetts reported:
[T]he Supreme Court issued an opinion giving very strict construction to his
language, which was in fact stricter than the Immigration Service itself wanted
to take and we have discussed this with the Immigration Service. While I could
not say that they signed off on the exact language of the gentleman from California, the Immigration Service told us in a subcommittee meeting that they
are convinced of the need to make some change.
Id. (statement of Rep. Frank).

